	Case 1:08-cv-01487-LG-JMR Document 8 Filed 12/23/08 Page 1 of 51 1
1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI SOUTHERN DIVISION
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4	BUTCH OUSTALET, INC. PLAINTIFF
5	V. CIVIL ACTION NO: 1:08CV1487
6	RAY ANTHONY LEGGETT DEFENDANT
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
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11	BEFORE HONORABLE LOUIS GUIROLA, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT SUDGE
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14	DECEMBER 22, 2008 GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI
15	COMPLEXITY THEOREM
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18	COURT REPORTER:
19	TERI B. NORTON, RMR, FCRR 2012 15TH STREET, SUITE 403
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	Case 1:08-cv-01487-LG-JMR Document 8 Filed 12/23/08 Page 2 of 51
1	APPEARANCES:
2	REPRESENTING THE PLAINTIFF:
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10	GULFPORT, MISSISSIPPI 39503
11	ALSO PRESENT: TRACI CASTILLE, FRANKE & SALLOUM
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1 THE COURT: We have one matter before the Court this 2 morning. Will the clerk please call the first case. 3 **DEPUTY CLERK:** Butch Oustalet, Inc. versus Ray 4 Anthony Leggett, cause number 1:08cv1487. 5 THE COURT: What says the plaintiff? 6 MS. BOBADILLA: Doris Bobadilla representing Butch 7 Oustalet Ford, Incorporated. 8 **THE COURT:** What says the defendant? 9 MS. GOLDEN: Good morning, Your Honor. La Quetta Golden, attorney, representing the defendant, Ray Leggett. 10 11 THE COURT: Very well. Let me first take up a matter 12 that has been brought to my attention on behalf of the 13 defendant, Mr. Leggett, who is here answering the motion for a 14 temporary injunction. This morning Mr. Leggett's counsel, Ms. 15 Golden, I presume, you filed on behalf of Mr. Leggett a motion to dismiss this matter for lack of jurisdiction. The motion 16 17 was filed at 9:23 this morning. Ms. Bobadilla, have you had an 18 opportunity to read the motion or to consider it? 19 MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, I have had an opportunity 20 to review the motion. However, I certainly would ask for an 21 opportunity to reply in writing within the procedures. 22 THE COURT: Well, of course, jurisdiction is a 23 threshold matter, and this Court either does or does not have the power to consider your request for an injunction, and I am 24 25 going to want to hear from counsel regarding, now that Ms.

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Golden has raised the question of jurisdiction, regarding whether or not this Court has any authority to issue an injunction. Were you prepared to do that?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, if I may address in my arguments the issues of how we have jurisdiction. However, my caution is that responding to Mr. Leggett's motion to dismiss without proper addressing of all of its points would waive my arguments, and honestly, as we have only had approximately about an hour and change in order to prepare an opposition, it would be wholly insufficient, I believe. So thus I can certainly address the jurisdictional issues in my argument in chief regarding the motion for injunctive relief, but I would certainly ask this Court for an opportunity to brief and oppose the motion to dismiss in writing.

MS. GOLDEN: To which, Your Honor, we object. We believe that if we are allowed to go first to show and prove the procedural elements of our motion to dismiss, then the substantive portion of their injunction will be moot, if the Court grants our motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: I think you are correct. If the Court does not have jurisdiction, then I will not go near the merits. That is a threshold question. And of course, it is up to the plaintiff who has brought this petition for injunctive relief to convince the Court that there is federal question jurisdiction. I think that is what you have alleged in your

complaint, that there is a federal question here, rather than diversity.

MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, Your Honor, we have, and I believe that is the basis of our jurisdiction, but again, obviously because of the seriousness of this matter, Your Honor, I believe that I would be doing my client a disservice if I did not properly address each and every aspect of the defendant's motion to dismiss and do so in writing in order to address all of the issues.

Frankly, the reason why we bring this particular motion in the time frame that we do is based on Mr. Leggett's threats regarding a deadline of December 22nd at 6:00 p.m. today. That is the reason as to why we bring the complaint for injunctive relief, the motion, in such haste, and also — but basically just received the motion to dismiss today. What we would ask Your Honor, if amenable, is to be allowed to oppose the motion to dismiss in writing. However, in the interim we request an interim order from this Court to allow us that opportunity in writing, but also order the defendant not to release this information or the substance of this litigation and the tape until such motion has been adequately opposed in writing before this Court within the allowable time.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, my client was just served with this hearing two days ago. So in haste I had to work on the motion to dismiss over the weekend, Saturday, Sunday, and

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this morning in order to get it filed this morning by 9:30. So, again, based upon what I have researched, if the Court doesn't have jurisdiction, we can't get into the merits of her injunction. Even if the Court wanted to, if the Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction, in re or in personam jurisdiction, we can't proceed on the substantive portion. And I believe that once we present our motion to dismiss, I am confident that the Court, after hearing what we have to present, will dismiss their application for injunction.

THE COURT: All right. It may, however, be time better spent, since we are here, to go ahead and permit the plaintiff to present whatever evidence they intend to, and then the Court will consider the jurisdictional question, and it may be unnecessary for me to reach the merits or to make a ruling on the merits if the Court does not have jurisdiction. But since the plaintiff only received the motion to dismiss today, and I know that you have been under time constraints as well, it may be a more fair process if we go ahead and get the plaintiffs', whatever evidence they intend to proceed with, including a demonstration, if you will, that there is at least a prima facie showing that the Court has some jurisdiction over this matter, and then I will give you an opportunity to properly respond in writing, and then reach a conclusion on what I consider to be the threshold question here, and that is whether or not the Court has the authority to issue any orders

whatsoever. All right?

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MS. BOBADILLA: We are amenable to that. We would ask, however, that the courtroom be held in seal. I believe there are individuals here that are not parties to this litigation, and because of the sensitivity of this issue, we would ask that the courtroom be cleared of anyone who is not either a party or a counsel on behalf of Butch Oustalet or Mr. Leggett.

MS. GOLDEN: The person that is in the courtroom to your left is Mrs. Leggett, Mr. Leggett's wife.

MS. BOBADILLA: And I believe, Your Honor, that we have also a representative here.

THE COURT: Mr. Harris is here on my request.

MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, sir, understood.

THE COURT: That motion is denied. I am ever vigil that these matters, whatever matters occur in court, remain transparent and open to the public, and it would be under the most unusual of circumstances that the Court would close those doors and not allow the public to understand and to review what is going on behind these doors. So that motion to seal the court is denied.

MS. BOBADILLA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. If you would, please, from the lectern -- do you intend to call any witnesses?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, we have two affidavits to

1 submit before you, and if I may submit those and approach. 2 **THE COURT:** You may. Have you shown them to counsel? 3 MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, Your Honor, I have. 4 MS. GOLDEN: Oh, I thought she was going to approach. 5 THE COURT: I think she is going to approach with the 6 affidavits. 7 MS. GOLDEN: Which we oppose those affidavits. 8 were filed at the time of the application for the injunction. 9 MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, you can see that we have 10 actually had those secured and dated as of today very shortly 11 before arriving before this Court. We will certainly 12 supplement the record and request that they be considered by 13 this Court in reference to our complaint for injunctive relief. 14 MS. GOLDEN: We believe that those were filed 15 immediately after they reviewed our motion to dismiss. And if 16 I may, Your Honor --17 **THE COURT:** Let me finish reading the affidavits. 18 ahead, Ms. Golden. 19 MS. GOLDEN: If I may, one of the affidavits is 20 submitted by Larry Clark. Larry Clark is the perpetrator of 21 the discrimination complaint that will be filed by Mr. Leggett. 22 He is also the person that is in the tape, in the videotape, 23 who is the main perpetrator. So we object to any credence that he would have to state in any affidavit. 24 25 THE COURT: Well, to the extent that these affidavits

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shed any light as to the allegations contained in the petition for injunction, I am going to allow them to be marked and admitted into the record. Again, in an effort not only to be transparent but to be complete, I think that all of this material should be included in the record, both of these affidavits. You have them marked as D and E. I will simply mark them as Plaintiff's Exhibits Number One and Two to this hearing.

(PLAINTIFF EXHIBITS ONE AND TWO INTRODUCED AND FILED INTO EVIDENCE.)

MS. BOBADILLA: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, Butch Oustalet,
Incorporated filed a complaint for injunctive relief. The
basis of the complaint for injunctive relief arises out of the
controversy within -- by Mr. Leggett, a current employee of
Butch Oustalet, Incorporated here in Gulfport, Mississippi.
Mr. Leggett, by counsel present before you, Ms. Golden,
submitted on October the 6th of 2008 a letter which indicated
that Mr. Leggett was subjected to a hostile work environment
due to racial discrimination while employed by Oustalet as a
salesperson. As a point of fact, Your Honor, Mr. Leggett is
still an employee of Butch Oustalet Ford, Incorporated here in
Gulfport; however, he has chosen to take medical leave and
indicated that he is unable to work due to stress conditions.

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The letters that Ms. Golden submitted on behalf of Mr. Leggett indicated that the subject matter of these complaints dealt specifically with racial discrimination and hostile work environment and noted in those letters which we have attached to the complaint for injunctive relief as arising out of Title VII, United States law, regarding discrimination and protection of race and gender. She also specifically indicated that if a demand for \$15 million was not paid for to resolve Mr. Leggett's claims, then she, on behalf of Mr. Leggett, would file an EEOC complaint and also release this alleged videotape to the media.

In response to her demands on behalf of Mr. Leggett, counsel, local counsel, Mr. Salloum's office, contacted Ms. Golden, denied the allegations, and indicated that an investigation must be conducted in order to determine whether or not Mr. Leggett's claims had any foundation whatsoever. The importance of the underlying claims is that Mr. Leggett's notice to the employer allegedly of these claims first came in the October 6, 2008 letter by his lawyer. He had never made any complaints regarding any racial discrimination, hostile work environment, sexual remarks, any of those things, while he was employed or continued to appear at work with Butch Oustalet, Incorporated. It wasn't until he retained a lawyer and then levied a \$15 million demand, or extortionist demand, against Butch Oustalet Ford to resolve these claims.

MS. GOLDEN: Objection to the word "extortionist,'
Your Honor.

MS. BOBADILLA: Thereafter --

MS. GOLDEN: I have an objection to the word

"extortionist." The demand letter was sent as customary to all
cases. A demand letter is always appropriate to be sent prior
to filing any type of action to see if the parties can resolve
it. That has always been the procedure that my office has
followed. I don't rush to court. That is not one of the
things that I do. So I object, emphatically object, to the use
of the term "extortionist."

THE COURT: All right. As a matter of courtesy -MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, Your Honor. I will contain my
remarks.

THE COURT: Let us attempt to use a word -- I am aware of the allegations in the petition, and I have no opinion one way or the other about whether the alleged conduct constitutes extortion or not, but as a matter of courtesy, courtesy to Ms. Golden, I think we can find another word to use.

MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, Your Honor. Thereafter, as noted by Mr. Oustalet's affidavit, he, on behalf of the dealership, conducted an investigation, as it was his first notice on October the 6th alleging these allegations. From his review and from his investigation of his employees, he did not

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find that Mr. Leggett's claims of racial discrimination or hostile work environment were well founded. December 15th of 2008, Mr. Leggett, myself, and a representative from the employer, Mr. Tommy Whitman, met in a conference in order to respond to Mr. Leggett's complaints and to find how a resolution might be made. In that conference Ms. Golden, on behalf of Mr. Leggett, indicated that if by December 15th, 2008, a resolution to the claims was not made, that thereafter the demand would rise to \$177 million. Thereafter, on behalf of Butch Oustalet Ford, noting the enormous amount of the demand and their investigation indicating that these claims were unfounded, we requested an extension of time in order to respond more fully to her demands. That extension was granted until December 19, 2008, thereby indicating that if a payment or response was not made to these claims by today, December 22, 2008, by 6:00 p.m., then this alleged racially charged videotape would be released to the media, including CNN, Barbara Walters, et cetera. Now, that is why, Your Honor, we have brought forth a complaint for injunctive relief, specifically requesting that the harm that we perceive would be made against Butch Oustalet, Incorporated, that Mr. Leggett be restrained from releasing this videotape and the substance of this litigation or anticipated litigation into the media. Now, in so doing, Your

Honor, we understand that our burden is to satisfy whether or

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not, under the factors for injunctive relief, whether or not we would potentially be successful on the merits of this claim.

Of importance and supported by the affidavits of Mr. Larry Clark and Butch Oustalet, this alleged videotape was made well over 20 years ago. Mr. Leggett is a long-time Butch Oustalet employee who in fact saw this videotape some 20 some odd years ago, never filed a complaint then, never made any issue regarding alleged racial discrimination or otherwise. It was not again until October 6, 2008 that he submits that on July 25, 2008, someone placed this videotape on his desk. Your Honor, we would submit, in response to an EEOC complaint, which the employee must and should submit in order to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to bringing judicial action, that his complaints of alleged racial discrimination would be time-barred because that videotape that he rests this case on is well over 20 years ago, and he has seen it that long ago. Thus, he would not be within the 180 days that he must file his complaint within.

Now, if in fact this Court indicates that the alleged placing of this videotape on his desk on July 25th of 2008 brings this as some sort of continuing violation, then we would submit that the act of placing the videotape which he has already seen would not constitute a violation under the hostile work environment and under Title VII. Thus, again, it would not bring — his claims would not be brought forth and rise to

the level of a continuing violation wherein he can circumvent the statute in which he must file his EEOC complaint.

There is substantial — there is a substantial threat that irreparable harm would be done to this dealership if in fact Mr. Leggett and Ms. Golden were allowed to dismiss or disseminate this videotape throughout the media. Butch Oustalet Ford is a company that has, and through the affidavit of Mr. Oustalet, has taken an alleged complaint by Ms. Golden, investigated it, determined that it is not well founded, and should be able to respond to these allegations under the EEOC and those administrative remedies. What Mr. Leggett and his counsel are attempting to do is to basically go around the system that has already been established for these types of complaints.

MS. GOLDEN: I object to that statement. That is not correct, and that is not what the letters state, and I object to that.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, I don't believe that anything I have said is — and I have tried to curtail my remarks, so I believe that she has an opportunity to respond.

THE COURT: Ladies, that is not -- it won't be helpful. I am going to let you, Ms. Golden, respond, obviously, to these arguments. I am still concerned as to why this is before this Court, and I am still waiting to hear where the jurisdiction lies. So let's go ahead and proceed, make a

complete record, and Ms. Golden, you know that I will give you a full opportunity to respond.

MS. BORADILLA: So, Your Honor, obviously, in reference, just going back to the elements of injunctive relief, the harm to the plaintiff will be substantially outweighed if in fact this videotape is allowed to be disseminated. If Mr. Leggett is allowed to go through the EEOC process, there is no harm that comes to him aside from exercising the rights that the government has set up for him. And also, granting the injunction will not disserve the public interest in any way. We are specifically talking about a private matter between an employer and employee based on Title VII claims; however, it does not involve the public interest in any way. Thus, Your Honor, under the elements of injunctive relief, I believe that we have met those requirements.

Addressing more fully the jurisdictional issues, the basis of the complaints within which Mr. Leggett has brought these claims deals specifically with alleged Title VII violations which are federal — which are protected by the federal law. Thus, because of the federal jurisdiction claims that he brings forth, this controversy between the employer and the employee are based in federal question jurisdiction. What the defendant would like to do is to not avail himself of the jurisdiction of the EEOC and the Federal Courts but rather try this case in the media before it actually gets to the venue where it should be,

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and thus what we have asked before this Court is to enjoin them from doing that. In fact, she has made a judicial admission that this is the subject, this claim is the subject of the EEOC. It is also Title VII claims. Thus, based on the letter submitted in our complaint for injunction, based on the affidavits that indicate that this controversy deals specifically with federal question jurisdiction, then, Your Honor, we submit the jurisdiction is proper here before this Court and that the plaintiff is entitled for injunctive relief. If in fact the Court submits regarding other procedural issues, we would request, as we have done earlier before argument, to submit in writing our opposition and/or amendment to the complaint prior to it being dismissed based on these issues or based on the allegations or complaints against the actual jurisdictional requirements. We submit that we have already met those, but to the extent that this Court feels that procedural deficiencies are present, we ask for leave to amend our complaint.

THE COURT: Well, it is my understanding that the Court has jurisdiction of a civil rights complaint under Title VII only because the EEOC has passed upon it and has given the plaintiff an opportunity to file a complaint, and that gives them the cause of action. But that has not occurred here yet. Mr. Leggett has not brought a claim before the EEOC. There is no determination by the EEOC. There is no right to sue letter.

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There is nothing here other than the possibility or the threat that Mr. Leggett may bring a claim which he may do. Why does that — under what circumstances would that now create a question, a federal question which gives this Court jurisdiction to do anything?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, we submit that Mr. Leggett has made a judicial admission that that is in fact -that is in fact the avenue in which he should follow. Title VII matter. It is also a matter that should be brought forth before the EEOC. Mr. Leggett should be following those regulations. And to come in and, one, not file before the EEOC, and then indicate that he should be shielded from federal jurisdiction because he will not file his EEOC, I think goes to basically disserve this plaintiff, because if, in fact, he should file an EEOC complaint and there we could actually defend these claims within the EEOC jurisdiction and parameters, then that would be one avenue, but he has failed to do that. So to not allow us to come in and to litigate these claims, which are, as judicially admitted by Mr. Leggett, Title VII claims and in fact subject of federal question jurisdiction, then it basically is a circular argument wherein they will not file their complaint but then say we should not be before this Court dealing with Title VII issues. So thus, Your Honor, we submit that we should be here because this is what the controversy, the Title VII and the federal question,

that is what the controversy entails. It is based on federal 1 2 question. This controversy between the employer and the 3 employee deals specifically with federal question, deals 4 specifically with Title VII. 5 THE COURT: Perhaps the underlying claim, but what is 6 before this Court is your effort to prevent the dissemination 7 of an embarrassing tape. 8 MS. BOBADILLA: Which arises out of alleged Title VII 9 violations. 10 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 11 MS. BOBADILLA: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Golden? 13 MS. GOLDEN: May it please the Court. Good morning, 14 Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. 16 MS. GOLDEN: I would like to first, if I may, address 17 and defend the attempts to amicably resolve a judicial claim 18 that my client has against his employer. 19 My client came to my office in September of 2008 with a 20 videotape in his hand. He stated that that tape was placed on 21 his desk on or about July 25, 2008. When we watched the tape, 22 that tape showed very despicable statements, racial epithets, 23 sexual innuendoes that is far worse than the tapes in the Texaco case. If Your Honor can recall, in the Texaco case the 24

tapes referred to African-Americans as black jellybeans, used

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racial epithets against African-Americans, and it also disparaged the Hanukkah and Kwanzaa holidays. The reason why Mr. Leggett placed the amount of demand in the demand letter, and we both agreed, because we researched, and I researched, the plaintiff -- I did research, and there was a plaintiff in the Morgan Stanley case. The plaintiff's name is Allison Sheflin. That plaintiff was awarded \$12 million in her claim against her employer, and it was the highest -- it was the largest any individual has ever received in a discrimination settlement. So we looked at that case to make a determination as to what amount we should ask for for Mr. Leggett. We didn't just pull that figure from the sky. Secondly, we went to and researched the Texaco case. If you can recall, Texaco was a class action case, and it settled for \$176 million in a class action. So Mr. Leggett and I discussed the possibility that if they did not want to resolve this case, we would open the case -- when we filed the lawsuit we would seek class certification and open the case up to class action status, and that is where the \$177 million was derived. So I take offense to anyone who is stating that we are trying to extort money. We think the tape is of public interest. I find it amazing that counsel opposite did not offer the tape to Your

amazing that counsel opposite did not offer the tape to Your
Honor to review in camera proceeding. In my opinion, it would
be very difficult for the Court to even rule on the substantive
nature of the tape without perusing the tape.

THE COURT: Well, I take you at your word that it is as you have described it and as you have represented it. I take you at your word.

MS. GOLDEN: And it is my practice, Your Honor, in my 20 something years of practice, I have always submitted a demand, a letter of demand. That is what I do. I am an attorney. I send a demand to see if we can amicably resolve the issues. I have my investigation, I have my set of facts. If the case cannot be resolved, then I proceed to court. And in my letters that I submitted, I emphatically told them, if the case cannot be resolved, my client will file an EEOC and he will proceed to court. Now, if my client did not have a justiciable claim, then I could see a concern for anybody requesting money if they don't have legal remedy in court, but I have just presented you two federal cases where the plaintiffs received millions for the alleged discrimination that occurred in their complaint.

Mr. Anthony Leggett is a victim. He is not the perpetrator. And before I get into the substantive, I want to argue my jurisdictional, my motion to dismiss, if I may.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, if I may, I object to the argument of the motion to dismiss based on your earlier ruling allowing us to oppose it in writing and thereafter, if this Court chooses, setting it for hearing.

THE COURT: I will allow Ms. Golden an opportunity to

argue her motion.

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MS. GOLDEN: Thank you. Your Honor, we believe that Butch Oustalet does not have a federal question before the In order for any litigants to bring a matter into Federal Court, there must be an issue of a violation of either a Federal Constitution, United States Constitution, or a treaty, or a federal common law, or some type of federal statute that will allow them an avenue to have standing and jurisdiction, the Court have jurisdiction. In this particular case the plaintiff filed what we call, what they labeled a complaint for injunctive relief. And in that complaint the summons was attached, but there is no such animal called a complaint for injunctive relief. What this really is, this legal instrument is really an application for injunctive relief, or a motion for injunctive relief, but they couched it in the terms of a complaint. But in the complaint they list -the only statute that they list stating that jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court is 28 U.S.C. 1331, which is the federal question jurisdiction. Well, there is no federal question presented in this entire document. They are not saying that Mr. Leggett has committed any type of federal statute violation or federal law violation or a treaty violation against Mr. Oustalet. That is not stated anywhere in here. They have relied heavily on 42 U.S.C. 2000e Title VII statutes as to their premise and why this Court should have

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jurisdiction. However, Mr. Leggett, that case, the future case of Leggett versus Oustalet, a Title VII claim, has not yet occurred and will not occur until 2009 because Mr. Leggett has to still file his EEOC charge of discrimination. And we, based upon our count, he has until January of 2009 before his 180 days expires. So there is no Title VII case right now pending before Your Honor, and that is the subject of our main reason for our dismissal. There is no Title VII complaint where Butch Oustalet is the plaintiff and Mr. Leggett is the defendant. That does not exist. This is the only document that is before the Court, and they are trying to get an injunction based upon future litigation.

So we submit to the Court that Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Leggett because there is nothing in these pleadings that are before the Court that would give rise to a federal question.

Secondly, the application itself is not supported by any type of sworn statement. And this makes some bold allegations in this alleged complaint, and it is not sworn to. And we submit that if they are going to make bold statements, it should have been sworn to by counsel opposite, which it was not. Therefore, this application is asking the Court to enjoin my client of his constitutional First Amendment right to go to the media, but yet they have not sworn to this 13 or so page document.

And then I also argued in my motion that they had no supporting affidavits attached. When Mr. Leggett was served with this document, they had no supporting affidavits to support their claim. Well, I just received the opposing affidavits this morning at 10:55 a.m., five minutes before the time for the hearing. Now, I want to object to these affidavits. I don't believe Larry Clark has any credence to give any type of sworn statement. I believe he is a racist. I believe he has judicial animus against —

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, may I object. I was instructed earlier, Your Honor, respectfully, not to engage in such comments, and I respectfully request that counsel opposite also --

THE COURT: I think that is a fair request, Ms.

Golden. We don't need to refer to anyone by any labels here today.

MS. GOLDEN: Secondly, I object to these affidavits because with Mr. Clark's affidavit number two, they said Mr. Leggett's discrimination claims are primarily based upon the videotape. That is untrue. Mr. Leggett has other evidence that he will present in his EEOC charge of discrimination that is other than the videotape. That is not the only evidence that he has. So that is an untrue statement. Likewise, it is an untrue statement in Exhibit E, or Exhibit Two, number four, it also says that Mr. Leggett's discrimination claims are

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primarily based on the videotape. That is also untrue. But they want me to argue and defend a case that is not yet ripe, that has not been processed through the EEOC yet. And I think it is unfair to Mr. Leggett to have him to come in and to defend all of this evidence when he is not yet required to do so. Mr. Leggett has retained my services to file an EEOC on his behalf, and I will represent to the Court that we will do so prior to the expiration of his 180 days.

Mr. Leggett, after my review -- Your Honor knows I have been doing these type of cases for a long time now, after reviewing Mr. Leggett's claims, he in fact has justiciable claims that he intends to take forward against Mr. Oustalet.

Now, another point that I want Your Honor to consider, Butch Oustalet, through the Ford executives, are on this videotape. The tape, if it is released, is extremely embarrassing, it is, but they want the Court now to come in and protect them from this embarrassing tape. And why should the Court give them such protection, when they are the ones who made the tape and distributed the tape? Someone distributed the tape even to Mr. Leggett. So now that we are proceeding on this legal course, now they want you to rush in and stop us. And I have a serious problem with them coming in here with the lack of jurisdictional argument. I don't believe they met that threshold jurisdictional standard. And an application for an injunction should be supported by affidavits that will show

unto this Court a clear and convincing and compelling reason for the Court to even grant it. And that is getting into the substantive part.

Also, they failed to request a bond and security, and according to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), that if — before this Court can issue a preliminary injunction, security must be posted, unless they are the United States Government or an agency of the United States Government. And as of this date they have not posted bond, nor have they requested it in their document that bond be waived. So there are a lot of procedural flaws in this application for injunctive relief.

And then, finally, they are -- I have never seen a case where you file for -- you open the file, a case in court, with the application for injunction. They should have filed a complaint first and then predicated upon that complaint simultaneous to or shortly thereafter filed an application for injunctive relief, not filed a complaint for injunctive relief. It muddies the water, and that is what they did. They called it a complaint, but it is not a complaint. It is simply an application for injunctive relief, and there is no complaint. We submit to the Court there is no complaint, the complaint which sets forth the allegations with specificity, showing the federal statute that has been violated, and that has not occurred in this case.

The Court should also know that the reason why Mr. Leggett

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has not filed his EEOC as of this date, although he still has time in the future, because counsel opposite, we were engaging in settlement negotiations. She would say, well, give us a little more time, I think we can resolve this, give us a little more time, I think we can resolve this, and they have requested three or four extensions throughout, since from October to now. So when they requested, she also stated, counsel opposite, well, I think your demands -- your demands are higher than our policy limits, I believe Lloyds of London is also looking into seeing whether or not they are going to join in to try to meet your demands. So if -- and again, Your Honor, if a case can be resolved confidentially and amicably without having to file a lawsuit, that is what I do. That is what I do for a living. Mr. Leggett has a constitutional right to go to the media. He has a right to do it. It doesn't matter how embarrassing the tape may be. And he still wants to go to the media because he thinks the public needs to know how these Ford executives think about their African-American customers. He also, in this Court, when I represented Chevron -- when I represented Reginald May versus Chevron, we had photographs that we obtained in evidence that were at least 40 years old of Chevron executives wearing Ku Klux Klan hoods over their faces with the Chevron emblem on the hood. Well, it was Judge Bramlette who presided over that case, and the same arguments came about as to whether or not my clients, Mr. Reginald May and John Brown,

should go to the media here and expose the corporation for what they really were. And Judge Bramlette showed that that, those photos, even though they were 40 years old, could establish a pattern and a practice of racial animus against my clients. So this tape, although it is 20 years old, it does show and it will show the racial animus that Larry Clark, Buddy Feeney have against my client and other African-American employees who work for the company, and for the African-American customers to which they serve.

Now, again, getting back to this tape, I am just amazed that they are asking you to restrain us from releasing this tape, and they have not brought the tape forward. But, Your Honor, I knew they weren't going to request for you to see the tape, but I brought the tape, and I am going to request an in camera proceeding. It is a 17-minute tape that will allow you to look at the tape and see it, and then you will understand why my client is upset and angry and disturbed over that tape. I am an African-American female, and when I saw that tape I was deeply offended, highly upset, over what these people have said about my people, and what they have said about me, and what they have said about females.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, I apologize for this intrusion, but I truly believe that counsel's arguments are going way beyond the scope of her motion and/or opposition.

THE COURT: I told you, Ms. Golden, I take you at

your word, and from the enthusiasm that both you and counsel for the plaintiff have exhibited here today, I have no doubt that the tape would be extremely embarrassing to one or more parties, and I don't think it would —— I do not think it would be helpful to this Court in trying to evaluate whether it has jurisdiction or not, or whether or not an injunction should or should not be granted to actually be subjected to the content of that particular tape. I take you at your word that it is racially insensitive and that it is a great embarrassment to one or more parties. What I am concerned with here more than anything else is whether or not this Court has the authority to do anything, and some underlying issues as well. So let's try to get on with that, and I will leave for another day, perhaps to a jury or for some other judicial tribunal to determine the underlying merits of Mr. Leggett's claim.

MS. GOLDEN: Now, Your Honor, also, in the Chevron matter, the Chevron officials were upset as well that their pictures went to the media. They were highly upset. But the constitutional right of a plaintiff to take his matter to the media is a fundamental right, and that is a right that Mr. Leggett has.

THE COURT: Then why hasn't Mr. Leggett done that already?

MS. GOLDEN: Because we were in the middle of settlement negotiations. He came to me, to my office, in

September. Well, they kept saying, well, let's see if we can work it out, work it out. It was only this week, last week, a week from today, that settlement negotiations broke down, and when those settlement negotiations broke down, that is when they ran to the Court and filed this application for an injunction. THE COURT: Well -- all right. I will let you finish your argument.

MS. GOLDEN: So with that, Your Honor, we respectfully request the Court to dismiss this application for injunction. We don't believe this Court has in re or in personam jurisdiction, no federal question jurisdiction over

Mr. Leggett, and that it should be in fact dismissed.

And I also want to defend my client's — the assertions, the underlying assertions that have been stated here today regarding my client. He has a right to try to settle any matter, and he also has a right, a constitutional right, if he wants to, to go to the media. If Your Honor — I am not sure if Mr. Leggett is going to go to the media, but he has a right to defend this application for injunction, and we believe these people are in the wrong court. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Golden.

MS. BOBADILLA: May I briefly reply, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Please be brief because I intend to move quickly.

1 MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, sir. Your Honor, in the 2 opposition to the complaint for injunctive relief, and then the 3 motion for injunctive relief that is before you, Ms. Golden 4 specifically cited federal cases. She specifically 5 characterized those not necessarily factually and analogously 6 correct to the complaints of Mr. Leggett, but in fact cited 7 federal cases in order to establish her opposition to our 8 injunctive relief. I submit that what she has done is again 9 make a judicial admission that this is actually the appropriate She has indicated twice during her argument that her 10 11 client has a judicial claim, he actually has a judicial claim. 12 What she has in fact stated and admitted is that her client has a claim for Title VII claims, hostile work environment arising 13 14 from federal question issues. However, they have chosen not to 15 act on those claims but in fact threaten this particular 16 company with either resolving the claim prior to defending 17 itself before the EEOC or paying either \$15 million or 18 \$177 million, depending on which day it is. Thus, Your Honor, 19 what we submit is that she has actually in fact stated that her 20 client has a claim, that the controversy between the employer 21 and the employee arises out of the federal question and arises 22 out of the Constitution. In fact, she has indicated that her 23 client, though I beg to differ and believe that she is wrong, has a constitutional right to do what he intends to do or has 24 25 threatened to do to disseminate this tape. Thus, those

arguments in and of themselves admit that this is the appropriate court to be before.

Thus, Your Honor, the procedural issues again we have requested to brief in writing. We have indicated that we filed the motion for injunctive relief. A bond can be posted today. So as to those procedural issues, those can either be, number one, are not faulted to the actual complaint and/or can be corrected. And we specifically indicate that through counsel's arguments, which she has indicated that her client does in fact have a claim, that claim is born on a federal question in Title VII.

THE COURT: I am going to give you until 1:00 to convince me of that, to provide this Court with some case authority, some statute, or some ruling by a Court of Appeals somewhere that this Court would have jurisdiction to rule on an injunctive matter where no underlying claim has ever been filed. You bring me something that convinces the Court that, at least a prima facie showing that I have got jurisdiction, and we will proceed; otherwise, I am very suspicious that this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter. I am going to give you until 1:00.

MS. BOBADILLA: And, Your Honor, would you like me to hand deliver it, Your Honor, submit it via fax? How would you like it done?

THE COURT: If you have got a case that confers

jurisdiction on me, I want to see it. You can either give me the citation or bring the case with you, but I am truly unpersuaded that I have the authority to do anything in this case in the posture in which it is in today.

What we have here, quite frankly, is that Mr. Leggett is in possession of a tape that is potentially embarrassing to your clients. Your clients do not want that tape disseminated to the media. So the question here is, no matter what the potential underlying claim may be, is whether I have got any underlying authority to stop them from doing what you don't want them to do, and that is to provide to the media, for whatever value the media may find in it, a potentially embarrassing tape recording. And I want to know what authority I have got to intercede on behalf of the plaintiff and where that authority comes from. You brought it as a federal question. There must be a statute or there must be some case interpreting a statute which would give me the authority to do what you ask.

MS. BOBADILLA: Yes, Your Honor. We will submit that.

THE COURT: We will reconvene at 1:00.

(NOON RECESS FROM 12:05 P.M. UNTIL 1:04 P.M.)

THE COURT: Ms. Bobadilla, were you able to find some authority for this Court to entertain this motion?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, if I may approach with a

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copy of the case, sir. In the interim, from approximately 12:00 to this time, I made a scurried search in order to determine additional authority. I reurge the fact, Your Honor, and I thank you and appreciate the fact that you granted us the opportunity to actually file a written response to the motion to dismiss that Ms. Golden has filed. However, in the interim, in regard to your order, we found the United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit Stewart versus Dunn cited as 363 F.2d In this discussion of the case -- and, Your Honor, I do submit that I have had an opportunity to review it; however, I certainly would wish a greater opportunity to review Ms. Golden's arguments and respond to them in writing and also submit before this Court on an issue of jurisdiction in a response in writing. However, on page eight it indicates that "The law is clear that pending a decision on the question of jurisdiction, a District Court has the power to issue a temporary restraining order in order to preserve existing conditions," and string cites United States versus United Mine Workers of America and other cases therein. I submit, Your Honor, under this case, the cited cases and others, that this Court does have the power, while it entertains whether or not it has jurisdiction over this complaint for injunctive relief and the subsequent motion for injunctive relief, to issue a temporary restraining order basically allowing for the existing conditions as is, i.e., that Mr. Leggett not have disseminated

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this tape to the public, or the substance of this litigation, or anticipated litigation.

Thus, I respectfully, number one, Your Honor, move and reurge your earlier allowing us to file a response, a written response to the motion to dismiss, and also, citing this case, indicate that you have the ability, and we would request that you issue a temporary restraining order in order to preserve the existing conditions. At this point my client is faced with a threat and ultimatum. And I don't mean to overstretch the definitions, in order not to be inciteful, but it is facing, one, a \$15 million demand or dissemination to the media, or a \$177 million demand if it does not resolve this claim. based on Ms. Golden and her client's threats and otherwise, and the cases, and what we have submitted to you in argument, affidavits and otherwise, we submit that we respectfully should be granted at least a temporary restraining order, allowed to properly brief the motion to dismiss and oppose same, and/or make any procedural corrections to our initial filing. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Golden, do you wish to respond?

MS. GOLDEN: Yes, sir. Again, Your Honor, I take exception to the characterization of threats. Again, what I surmise, I submitted demand letters, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, I have spoken with counsel opposite several times trying to resolve this case, and not once does

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she tell me that she or her client felt threatened in any way. My first time hearing about any type of threat was when they filed this application for a preliminary injunction. conversations that we have had with opposing counsel have been amicable. They have been cordial. They have stated, let's see what we can do to try to resolve the claim. So this is simply an attempt to settle a justiciable claim, and they want to make it seem like it is more than what it really is, but it is not. I take offense to counsel opposite coming in here on the record trying to characterize my client and me in a manner that is disparaging. Again, he has a right to go, a constitutional right to go to the media. That is his First Amendment right. He has a right to try to settle a claim before proceeding to Federal Court. Now that we see that they are not interesting in settling, then he is going to exercise his right to go to the EEOC and exhaust his administrative remedies.

Now, I just received this case, Your Honor, and just a cursory review of it, I want to point out a couple of things to Your Honor. In this case, this case is not like the case at bar at all. On page three in the second column, second paragraph, where it begins with "The complex and confused events", it says that the party filed a complaint, and the issue, we have a diversity jurisdictional issue in this case. This case involved Hyde Construction Company in the Mississippi District Court against Koehring Company, which is a nonresident

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corporation. That would invoke diversity jurisdiction. So the Court in this case had diversity jurisdiction to determine and discuss the contractual issues involved in this case. There is no diversity jurisdiction issue in the case at bar. In the case at bar, my client is a Mississippi resident, and Butch Oustalet Incorporation is a Mississippi corporation. So diversity jurisdiction is not here.

The reason why the judge could issue a temporary restraining order in this case is because the underlying -- he had an underlying jurisdictional basis, and that was the jurisdictional -- diversity jurisdiction.

Secondly, now the plaintiffs, when they served my client, they served upon him a complaint for an injunction. They were seeking a permanent injunction. They were not seeking an application for temporary restraining order. Under Rule 65 there are certain requirements one must take if they are seeking a temporary restraining order. They "must have specific facts in an affidavit or verified complaint clearly showing that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition, and the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reason why it should not be required." Opposing counsel didn't do this. They want you now to issue a temporary restraining order, but she did not sign a verified pleading, she did not submit an affidavit to

this Court as to why the Court should — she didn't articulate with specificity in a sworn affidavit the immediate and irreparable harm, and because of that, then this Court — it goes back to the original issue this morning. If this Court doesn't have federal question, or if it doesn't have — if this Court doesn't have diversity jurisdiction, then it cannot issue any orders over Mr. Leggett. The Court does not have the power to issue an order over Mr. Leggett if a federal violation such as what we mentioned, if it doesn't exist, and it is not in these pleadings. The pleadings, again, are fatally flawed. I would consider them DOA, dead on arrival.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, I apologize for the intrusion. We were here in order to determine whether or not there was a case that I could submit to you. This is argument that I believe that we have heard this morning, and I believe that I should be, again, allowed to respond to her in writing within the ten days allowed. This particular case shows that this Honorable Court has the power to issue a restraining order pending the review of its jurisdiction. Now, I don't want to belabor the Court, but what she is basically doing is arguing this all over again, without allowing me time to respond in writing for that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You may proceed.

MS. GOLDEN: A temporary restraining order is only good for ten days. So to restrain the defendant at all, we

submit that the Court doesn't have the jurisdiction to restrain the defendant for one day, let alone ten days. Again, this underlying case, you have the complaint that was filed, and you have diversity jurisdiction. They haven't filed a complaint. At best what you can call what they filed is an application for an injunction. Where is the federal question? Where is the complaint? There is no complaint. They have called it a complaint, but it is not a complaint. It is an application for permanent injunction.

So based upon that, Your Honor, their pleadings are fatally flawed, and we pointed that out this morning. And the Court does not have jurisdiction, and this case does not give this Court jurisdiction over Mr. Leggett because the facts in this case are totally different. There is no diversity jurisdiction here, and if it was, then it would be different, but we don't have a diversity jurisdiction argument in this case today. And I am not trying to tell them how to practice law, but we are in the wrong court. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Golden. Anything else on behalf of the plaintiff?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, again, at this point we believe that the motion to dismiss, as earlier ruled on by this Honor, we should be allowed to specifically brief and respond to, within the procedure, the written responses to this motion to dismiss. To the extent that we believe that this Court does

have the power to issue a temporary restraining order while it considers its jurisdiction, we submit the case before you. I appreciate that it is a jurisdictional — diversity jurisdictional issue; however, the actual ruling held within this indicates that the Court has that power. It is not caveated by "it has that power within diversity jurisdiction." It merely says that the Court has that power to do that and to issue a temporary restraining order. Thus, I respectfully request that you allow, as you this morning indicated that we could file a written response within the procedural guidelines to this motion to dismiss, and that a temporary restraining order be issued during the time that you are considering your jurisdiction.

I beg to differ. We in fact went ahead and submitted affidavits, sworn affidavits by our clients, which this Court accepted into the record. They are sworn affidavits. To the extent that any bond or otherwise needs to be issued, again, that can be done within today's time frame or within the procedural requirements maintained by the request for the temporary restraining order.

MS. GOLDEN: Shortly, Your Honor, if I may.

THE COURT: Um-hm.

MS. GOLDEN: There are strict compliances to Rule 65, and to enjoin my client at all, they have to strictly comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 65. They haven't

done that, Your Honor. They haven't even met the basic threshold, and forcing us to come in here today on a short notice, and they have not submitted any facts or any affidavits. It is not just affidavits from others. It is incumbent upon the attorney that is filing it to file an affidavit, and she failed to do that.

And then, again, I believe the basic civil procedure principle is that in order for a judge to issue any order over anyone, whether restricting, denying, or forcing them to go forward, the Court must have and decide jurisdiction before it goes into the merits of any case. That is a basic premise, whether it is in State Court or Federal Court. And we submit that this Court does not have jurisdiction over Mr. Leggett, based upon the pleadings that have been presented today. This Court, this case that they have presented, does not change what was stated this morning in court. The fact, Your Honor, that that case that they have presented had — the Court did have jurisdiction, and once the Court says it has diversity jurisdiction, then it can enter orders, whether it be temporary or permanent. But in this case, there is no jurisdiction, and we —

THE COURT: I think what the plaintiff is talking about is that the Court has jurisdiction to consider whether it has jurisdiction. And while I tend to agree with you, that it is very questionable whether this Court has jurisdiction to

entertain the merits of this petition, that what the plaintiff is asking for is some time within which to present briefing on the jurisdictional question and for this Court to maintain the status quo while they do that.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, my client is also running out of time. His time is running.

THE COURT: Running out of time to do what?

MS. GOLDEN: He wants to file his EEO --

asking that he be restrained from that. There is nothing that would prevent Mr. Leggett from walking out of the courtroom today, and I would never take action that would prevent Mr. Leggett from filing a claim with the EEOC, if that is what he wishes to do. The nature of this petition is to prevent Mr. Leggett from disseminating what has been characterized at best a very embarrassing videotape recording.

MS. GOLDEN: And if I may, Your Honor, it goes back to my initial inquiry. How can the judge enter any order restraining Mr. Leggett's ability to engage in his First Amendment constitutional right when the Court has not reviewed the tape? I find that -- I just find that -- that would be something that I believe the Court should review in camera before it even determines should it restrain Mr. Leggett.

THE COURT: Well, the purpose of restraining Mr.

Leggett temporarily would only be for this Court to consider

whether it has jurisdiction to ultimately enter an order that enjoins him. I don't -- while I think that ultimately the burden upon the plaintiff is going to be a difficult hurdle to overcome, I don't see any harm in allowing them a short amount of time within which to brief it. Besides, it may be good practice in the event that this matter ends up before the Court of Appeals. I don't want to snap to judgment.

I could be wrong on the jurisdictional question. I don't think, quite frankly, Ms. Bobadilla, that I am, but I will at least give you an opportunity, and I will refer to it as a very brief opportunity, to convince me that this Court has jurisdiction of this matter. I am very suspicious of that, and I would be -- I will be educated if you are able to provide case authority which would convince me that I need to proceed to the merits.

And Ms. Golden, in answer to your invitation to review the tape, it doesn't matter what is on that tape. If I do not have jurisdiction of this case, then it doesn't really matter whether the tape is good, bad, or ugly. It will not help me — it will not help me in determining whether or not I have jurisdiction on the merits.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, I have spent 23 hours in preparing, from last Thursday until today, I have spent 23 hours responding to their — and researching their "complaint for an injunction." I am also requesting to be reimbursed my

reasonable attorney's fees should the Court find that their application has no merit and they don't have jurisdiction.

MS. BORADILLA: Your Honor, I thank you for the opportunity to brief and oppose Ms. Golden's motion. Ms. Golden obviously has submitted that this claim, or at least a resolution of this claim, is either worth \$15 million or \$177 million if my client doesn't do what she requested to do. So thus, I submit that if she believes their case, that to be true, that she has signed on to her client to do her job, whether it takes 25 hours, 26 hours, or otherwise. I respectfully object to her request. Nonetheless, I thank you for the opportunity to brief this, Your Honor, and respectfully request that if you do not give me the ten days under the statute, that at least five business days be given. Thank you, sir.

THE COURT: Well, I can assure you that ten days, in my judgment, is too long. I want to try to be fair, but, unfortunately, the holidays approach, and while I am not unsympathetic to the concept that everyone likes to take some time off on Christmas Eve and Christmas and perhaps the day after, I would like to have this matter resolved. I don't want it hanging. And I don't think it is fair to the plaintiff, I don't think it is fair to the defendant, for it to be hanging out there any longer than it has to be.

Today is the 22nd, the afternoon of the 22nd. Can you

submit your brief by the morning of the 24th?

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, since it was posed as a question, I would respectfully request to be given at least until December 29th to submit. I will certainly abide by this Court's order, as I have today, however I respectfully request at least to December 29th, which would be one week from today.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, we oppose this. This is their complaint.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, again, I would do what this Court ordered.

THE COURT: One at a time, please. One at a time.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, this is their complaint.

They are the ones who got out here first and said, we are going to file this injunction. They need to have their ducks in a row and have everything together when we come to court. They are the ones who requested this court hearing today. We were dragged here today to be in court on their complaint for an injunction, and I respectfully submit to Your Honor, my client wants to move on with the process, and this is continuously going on and on, just like how she was doing in the settlement negotiations.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, he can file his EEOC complaint at any time. I don't believe that we are standing in his way to actually do what he should do under the law. All I am basically trying to do is to protect our client and do it

well. Again, Your Honor, whatever opportunity you afford me, within reason, we will certainly, which I submit it will be, we will certainly abide by that. I respectfully requested additional time, but again, whatever your Court's order is.

THE COURT: Ms. Golden, I certainly don't want to cut you off from any possible reply that you might have. Do you wish to have a reply to their briefing on the jurisdictional question? You have already raised it.

MS. GOLDEN: I think I have briefed it, Your Honor. So I don't know what they -- it is hard for me to answer that because I don't know what they are going to say in their memorandum of authorities.

THE COURT: That is true, and I don't want to cut you off if you want to reply, but you need to tell me -- if you don't intend to reply, I will rule on what is before me. If you do want some time to reply, then I want to try to be fair with you, too.

MS. GOLDEN: I would like to have time to reply if I so choose. Your Honor, I may not choose to. I don't know yet, but I would like to have that opportunity in case --

THE COURT: How will I know if you choose not to?

MS. GOLDEN: Well, if the judge wants to give me a day or so to respond, I don't object to that.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. GOLDEN: But I believe we are clear in our motion

1 to dismiss.

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THE COURT: I think so.

MS. GOLDEN: And I really don't think it would be necessary for me to file a reply to their response.

THE COURT: Well, once you receive their brief, if you think that you don't need to file a reply, why don't you say so in the form of a pleading, that you do not intend to reply, and that way I can go ahead and rule rather quickly, which is what I would like to do. I will give the plaintiff until Friday, the 26th, within which to brief the jurisdictional question.

MS. BOBADILLA: Thank you, Your Honor.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, since you have given them until Friday, the 26th, to submit a response, if I decide not to submit a reply, would the Court be making a decision on the 26th or --

THE COURT: I will be making it as soon as all of the pleadings are available. In this day of electronic filing, that could be rather quickly.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, I would waive our right then, since the 26th is this Friday, I will waive our right to file a reply to their response. I think our motion to dismiss is sufficient.

THE COURT: Then when I say the 26th, I want the plaintiff to have their response to the motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction no later than noon on the 26th.

MS. BOBADILLA: Thank you, Your Honor. Are we free to go, sir?

THE COURT: I am not sure. I am still thinking.

MS. BOBADILLA: Your Honor, I thank you for the opportunity to respond in writing until December the 26th at noon.

THE COURT: I know it puts a burden on the plaintiff and the defendant as well, but this does not need to be festering any longer than it has to.

MS. BOBADILLA: And Your Honor, I do submit that I will not unnecessarily delay. I will certainly review this as quickly as possible. My request for additional time was, frankly, to make sure I did the appropriate job that I needed to do.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. GOLDEN: Your Honor, if I may, are we continuing this hearing until the 26th? Because I want to make sure -- I want to understand what the order is going to read, because they were requesting a temporary restraining order, and which we opposed that. I will submit to the Court, as an officer of the Court, we will not go to the media between now and the time we get the Court's order on the -- since we have been --

THE COURT: You would be restrained from doing so.

MS. GOLDEN: But my question is, is the order couched

in the form of a restraining order, or is the order just for a continuance?

THE COURT: No. What I am doing is, I am giving the plaintiff an opportunity to respond to your motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. In the interim, the Court will be considering whether it — it will have jurisdiction to consider whether it has jurisdiction. I know that is a funny way to say that, but the cases follow that line. And once I determine whether or not I have jurisdiction, well, then I will rule one way or the other. In the interim, then, you are restrained from disseminating this tape recording or — is it a video recording or a —

MS. GOLDEN: Video.

THE COURT: You are restrained from disseminating the video recording until the Court has had an opportunity to consider whether it has jurisdiction over the complaint at all.

MS. GOLDEN: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: And again, Ms. Golden, I have not made up my mind, and I shouldn't, but I tend to think that it is unlikely that the Court has jurisdiction over this application, but with all deference to the plaintiff, as an officer of the Court Ms. Bobadilla wants to represent her client and wants to be sure that she does it well, and I want to give her that opportunity.

Of course, the Court now is in an awful position to be in.

Case 1:08-cv-01487-LG-JMR Document 8 Filed 12/23/08 Page 49 of 51 49 1 There are two intertwining issues here that make this extremely 2 difficult. The underlying issue, of course, is whether or not 3 the defendant here should be permitted to present to the media, 4 or to any other person, for that matter, a video recording 5 which may be embarrassing to the plaintiff. There is, however, 6 an underlying issue that is -- that weighs on the Court that is very disturbing to the Court and one which generates some 7 8 obligation on the part of the Court to do something. 9 reviewed the pleadings, and it is clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff has made some allegations that border on criminal 10 11 conduct, or at the very least border on unethical conduct on 12

the part of counsel for the defendant. I have also reviewed

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the attachments to the petition, and it is apparent from those attachments that, again, there is at least some support for the

allegation that there has been some wrongdoing on the part of

the defendant, or perhaps even on counsel for the defendant.

Ms. Golden, in your letters that you have written to the plaintiff, which you have characterized as an effort to settle

19 an underlying claim, unfortunately you condition or you make a

condition to the payment of this 15 million-dollar sum the

revelation of evidence to the media or to other individuals.

Of course, I, or the Court for that matter, have no difficulty

with a plaintiff that has a putative claim making an effort to

settle that claim, and to settle it for money, and that is, of

course, to settle the underlying claim, but unfortunately,

perhaps the language in your letters has gone farther than just settling the underlying claim. You have made a threat to reveal this embarrassing video recording to the media as part of what you have characterized as a settlement. That may — and I have no opinion as to how it would come out, but that may constitute some violation which generates in me an obligation to report that to the appropriate authority, and I intend to do so.

I express no opinion as to Mr. Leggett's underlying putative claim for violation of his rights. He has the right to bring that claim, and he certainly has a right to have it adjudicated. I express no opinion as to the admissibility of this video recording, which may tend to support his underlying claim, but what may be objectionable here is the threat that in the absence of paying money, that the tape would be revealed to the media, and that may have crossed the line. I leave that ultimate determination, however, to the appropriate executive authorities. I thought, in fairness to you and in fairness to your client, you should know that I have no alternative but to take that action. All right. Anything else on behalf of the plaintiff?

MS. BOBADILLA: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Anything else on behalf of the defendant?

MS. GOLDEN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. You are excused.

1 (HEARING CONCLUDED.)

CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I, Teri B. Norton, RMR, FCRR, Official Court
Reporter for the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi, appointed pursuant to the provisions
of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify
that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings
reported by me using the stenotype reporting method in
conjunction with computer-aided transcription, and that same is
a true and correct transcript to the best of my ability and
understanding.

I further certify that the transcript fees and format comply with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States.

S/ TERI B. NORTON, RMR, FCRR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER